Remember The Surge

If the White House and General Petraeus are in agreement, then the report to Congress to be delivered on September 15, 2oo7, may cite that the surge in troop levels is working just as expected. That is not a very large 'if'; both President Bush and General Petraeus have a large stake in assuring the public that their actions are finally having the intended effect as opposed to all prior actions and shortfalls experienced in the previous four years. It is not even surprising that instead of a detailed report coming straight from the military, the West Wing will cobble together the relevant details Congress may need.

But at least they will be able to speak directly, frankly, and publicly with the architect of the escalation in occupational forces.

Well, maybe not.

From the Washinton Post article above by Jonathan Weisman and Karen DeYoung from August 16:

"Senior congressional aides said yesterday that the White House has proposed limiting the much-anticipated appearance on Capitol Hill next month of Gen. David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker to a private congressional briefing, suggesting instead that the Bush administration's progress report on the Iraq war should be delivered to Congress by the secretaries of state and defense.

White House officials did not deny making the proposal in informal talks with Congress, but they said yesterday that they will not shield the commanding general in Iraq and the senior U.S. diplomat there from public congressional testimony required by the war-funding legislation President Bush signed in May. "The administration plans to follow the requirements of the legislation," National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said in response to questions yesterday."

Even if there is something positive to be had from there reports and interviews, why limit it to private conversations? With this issue being the most prominent point on the public mind in America, wouldn't it serve the interest of the public to have the most forthright report possible out of the commanders themselves, and have it delivered to the country in an open forum where concerns and worries of the people can be expressed through the conduit of Representatives and Senators?

Maybe there could be answers to questions such as what Iraq and the U.S. will do for cities like Basra, which at one point were calm and secure but now are finding in-fighting among the various factions a serious destabilizing effect. Ben Lando of UPI notes that this oil-rich region is almost the sole source of Iraq's revenues currently, and that stability there means that Iraq still has the chance to tread water for the time being while the northern pipelines continue to suffer attacks and disruptions.

In a telling passage, Lando writes how three Shiite factions have set themselves up to establish control over this vital region:

"In Basra, three Shiite parties, powerful in their varied own right, swap allegiances and gunfire and jockey for position: the Fadhila Party, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (formerly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), and the Sadr Movement, led by cleric Moqtada Sadr.

The Fadhila Party gained control of the province in the 2005 elections, but only with 21 of 41 seats, and with a coalition of other parties and independents. SCIRI took the rest. Sadr has no official seats but loyalists.

All three began their power play, infiltrating the police and the bureaucracy. The Fadhila Party grabbed control of the oil facilities protection service, which put it “in a position to really control how much is or is not smuggled,” said Ken Katzman, Middle East expert at the Congressional Research Service. “You can do whatever you want … it’s control over the proceeds of the smuggling.” "

That isn't the strong arm of Iran working, that is outright factional dissension seeded by a toothless central Iraqi government that has little control over the country at large. It wouldn't be fair to target the troop increase as a fault for the instability in Basra, but it is worth mentioning that when one area becomes more secure, there are many other areas in Iraq that are quite susceptible to civil war and terrorist acts. The incredibly massive attacks against the Yazidi people in Nineveh province on August 14th is another example.

As a last ditch effort, the U.S. military surge may probably be viewed as a stalemate. It can lock down neighborhoods, it can sweep villages for suspects with dubious results, but it will not make a civil war go by the wayside. A strong-arm military occupation cannot even produce real political results in the Iraqi Parliament. To the extent that Prime Minister al-Maliki had to form a new coalition in Parliament that doesn't even comprise a majority in the body lends credence to the mixed results of a show of force in Iraq this late in the game.

Occupations aren't won by military tactics. The people and the government of the occupied country either boot out the occupier or come to terms with themselves and grow a sustainable country whereby the occupier is no longer needed. In terms of Iraq, there is little if any chance that a duly elected government containing all of the various fractious elements inside the country can produce a sustainable government - anyone could have seen that coming nine years prior to the invasion. If that is the case, then what is left is a country which will be severely damaged for many years to come with or without the help of American soldiers and Marines.

Expect the surge to be polished nicely come mid-September, but do not expect the news to be any better for a very long time.

I. Lewis Libby - Free At Last, Free At Last

After months and months of withholding comment due to an on-going investigation, President Bush finally stepped forward to commute the sentence of I. Lewis Libby after his conviction and loss on appeal of his sentencing to thirty months in prison. When speaking of the commuting of the sentence of the former chief of staff for Vice President Cheney, Bush said that while the conviction would stand, the sentence by the judge was too harsh for the crime.

This from a former Governor of Texas who saw fit to allow Betty Lou Beets to be executed - a 62 year-old great-grandmother. Thirty months in prison to harsh a sentence?

It would be highly embarrassing if there was a case similar to Libby's in the press at about the same time which might cast doubt on whether or not the sentence was too harsh. Enter Victor Rita, who was challenging his sentence to 33 months in prison for a perjury charge. The Supreme Court rejected that appeal and Mr. Rita will be placed in federal prison to serve his time. No word from the Executive Mansion about whether he will have his sentence commuted or not.

So it is that this saga closes. Or does it?

An interesting point occurred to some in the press that at about the time when Libby was going to be placing before the court his defense, including calling several key witnesses such as Karl Rove and the Vice President himself, his defense team suddenly reversed course and summarily wrapped up its case without so much as a statement by the defendant. At the time it was presumed that either the defense did not need to place Libby and other officials on the stand or that it was too much of a risk to place them on the stand. As Andrew Cohen summarized it:

"Any way you slice it -- at least any way I see it sliced -- today's news bodes ill for the defense. I have been surprised before in cases like this, and good defense attorneys often have a knack for knowing when less is more. But I just don't see it."

If the defense might have known that the President was considering a commutation or a pardon, the theory goes that Libby and the others involved in this affair would have more than enough reason to stay silent. Libby would be at no further disadvantage - he was going to be convicted for telling FBI officials and the grand jury that he did not disseminate Wilson's identity but only heard it from Tim Russert (who then testified to the exact opposite of that alibi) - and the protection of further releases of information for those currently within the Administration would be maintained as well.

But fair is fair, the President has the power of the pardon and that is just the way the Constitutional cookie crumbles, correct? Not exactly. That would be tampering with justice, and very much in line with a cover-up if events followed that path. Naturally Congress would wish to do a bit of sleuthing in order to ensure that all of this transpired quite the opposite way as outlined above. All one would need to do is ask that I. Lewis Libby testify before Congress and then have him, a convicted liar, explain that everything was above the board and that would be that. Here is where the commutation comes in. Libby still must serve the probationary period of his sentence (even though Judge Walton was not so certain of this at the time of the President's actions) which in effect means that he is still serving time in a way. If only he had a full pardon from the President, then his fine ($250,400) and his probation would have been wiped clean and a call before Congress might likely mean he would have no reason to plead the 5th. This is by far the worst of stretches to entertain though, as any deal made behind the scenes between the White House and Libby's defense team would almost certainly have illegal implications providing for an extremely good use of one's 5th amendment right to avoid self-incrimination.

Yet this President and Vice President have played pretty rough with legalities over the course of six years. It would be worth a cursory look by the House and Senate just to make sure that nothing untoward occurred during the months of January and February 2007 that cut short jury and the court's ability to mete out justice.

Until that point, Libby's bank account is presumably smaller, and Victor Rita is doing time.

Postscript:
There was so much hand wringing by defenders of the Bush decision that it became rather humorous to see where people would go to defend the commuting of the Libby sentence. One of the less enlightening comments was from David Brooks on July 3rd, and one of the more artful parries came in David Corn's response to Brooks' article. Sometimes the truth can be a weapon.

David Hicks In The Hands Of The United States

Many times when perusing stories of how the United States is pursuing terrorists abroad, it becomes very simple to disconnect from the "terrorists" since they are faceless, nameless for the most part, and are seeking to do us harm here. At least, that is the essence of most reports where the Administration talking points are concerned. As long as the enemy combatants are anonymous, then things are not all that bad.

Then examples pile up of those that are less than anonymous, and slowly the process employed to detain and interrogate the "terrorists" is revealed to the public. Jose Padilla, Yaser Hamdi, and David Hicks have shed some of that missing light on the way in which America handles this new threat.

And it has become apparent for some time that the threat is handled via grotesque methods. Glenn Greenwald's post today regarding the Hicks case jumps off from the U.S. Air Force Col. Morris D. Davis's op-ed in the New York Times defending the process. Colonel Davis cited the admission by Hicks that his treatment was fine, and that he was guilty of what the government said he was guilty of. From his opinion piece:

"Critics liken Guantánamo Bay to Soviet gulags, but reality does not match their hyperbole. The supporters of David Hicks, the detainee popularly known as the "Australian Taliban," asserted that Mr. Hicks was mistreated and wasting away. But at his March trial, where he pleaded guilty to providing material support to a terrorist organization, he and his defense team stipulated he was treated properly. Mr. Hicks even thanked service members,..."

Contrast that with statements by Hicks to his family members and other detainees before the government was forced to drop its charges and bring new charges after the Hamdan decision.

"In an interview with ABC TV's Four Corners program, Hicks's father Terry has detailed allegations of physical and sexual abuse of his son by American soldiers.

"He said he had a bag over his head and he said, 'Oh look, I know their accents - they're definitely American' - some pretty horrific things that were done to him," he said.

David Hicks also told his father he was given injections by the Americans and then anally penetrated with various objects.

Another detainee says David Hicks told him of being flown by helicopter off a warship to an undisclosed location where he was spat on and beaten before being brought back to the ship."

So why would Hicks sign a deal with the U.S. military and why was such a deal proffered to him, a terrorist?

From the thorough articles by Jo Becker and Barton Gellman on the Vice President in the Washington Post:

"Air Force Two touched down in Sydney this past Feb. 24. Cheney had come to discuss Iraq. Prime Minister John Howard brought the conversation around to an Australian citizen who had unexpectedly become a political threat.

Under pressure at home, Howard said he told Cheney that there must be a trial "with no further delay" for David Hicks, 31, who was beginning his sixth year at the U.S. naval prison at Guantanamo Bay. Five days later, Hicks was indicted as a war criminal. On March 26, he pleaded guilty to providing "material support" for terrorism.

At every stage since his capture, as he changed taxis at the Afghan-Pakistan border, Hicks had crossed a legal landscape that Cheney did more than anyone to reshape. He was Detainee 002 at Guantanamo Bay, arriving on opening day at an asserted no man's land beyond the reach of sovereign law. Interrogators questioned him under guidelines that gave legal cover to the infliction of pain and fear -- and, according to an affidavit filed by British lawyer Steven Grosz, Hicks was subjected to beatings, sodomy with a foreign object, sensory deprivation, disorienting drugs and prolonged shackling in painful positions.

The U.S. government denied those claims, and before accepting Hicks's guilty plea it required him to affirm that he had "never been illegally treated." But the tribunal's rules, written under principles Cheney advanced, would have allowed the Australian's conviction with evidence obtained entirely by "cruel, inhuman or degrading" techniques.

Shortly after Cheney returned from Australia, the Hicks case died with a whimper. The U.S. government abruptly shifted its stance in plea negotiations, dropping the sentence it offered from 20 years in prison to nine months if Hicks would say that he was guilty.

Only the dramatic shift to lenience, said Joshua Dratel, one of three defense lawyers, resolved the case in time to return Hicks to Australia before Howard faces reelection late this year. The deal, negotiated without the knowledge of the chief prosecutor, Air Force Col. Morris Davis, was supervised by Susan J. Crawford, the convening authority over military commissions. Crawford received her three previous government jobs from then-Defense Secretary Cheney -- she was appointed as his special adviser, Pentagon inspector general and then judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

Emphasis not in the original article.

So Hicks was marched through quickly to help out the Prime Minister of Australia. And his admission that he was treated fairly had absolutely nothing to do with his enduring five years of imprisonment with no knowledge of when or if he would ever see freedom or whether charges would keep appearing before him, holding him in limbo. It is also incredibly curious to find a plea deal where one must acknowledge the style of treatment one has received up to that point. "We will let you go only if you sign a statement saying how good you were treated, otherwise if you do not sign said paper we will keep you here." From Greenwald's post, he linked to this article on Boston.com which expands on the plea deal.

Does anyone put forward that this sounds even remotely approximate to justice? Place the person in a cell and throw away the key? Even worse, interrogate the individual with disturbing techniques that likely provide little in the way of intelligence? To those in the West Wing it seems alright.

It used to be unthinkable that a high official within the United States could ever be tried for war crimes. I don't think that is so far-fetched any more, and that is truly sad.

Why Iraq Is Not A Divided Korea

Several allusions have been made in recent weeks by the Administration that a long-term outlook for the Iraqi occupation can be modeled on the country of Korea and its fifty-plus years of division. That this is being seriously stated as a path forward for a country torn three different ways by civil war is as far removed from reality as one can desire. From a White House press briefing:

MR. SNOW: Here is -- what the President means by that is that at some point you want to get to a situation in which the Iraqis have the capability to go ahead and handle the fundamental matters of security. You have the United States there in what has been described as an over-the-horizon support role so that if you need the ability to react quickly to major challenges or crises, you can be there, but the Iraqis are conducting the lion's share of the business -- as we have in South Korea, where for many years there have been American forces stationed there as a way of maintaining stability and assurance on the part of the South Korean people against a North Korean neighbor that is a menace.

In this particular case, what you want to be able to do -- and I'm now not trying to draw comparisons with any of the neighbors of Iraq, but instead, simply taking a look at the situation within Iraq proper. You get yourself into a position where you do have security in places like Baghdad and at the provincial level, and then you provide security as long as seems reasonable to the Iraqi people who are, after all, your hosts and the ones making the invitations.

Q For 50 years?

Q Now, the Korean model, you've got thousands of U.S. troops there for some 50 years. I mean, how is that comparison and vision in that --

MR. SNOW: Wendell just asked the same question. I don't think -- again, that's not strictly comparable because what you have is a North Korea that continues to be a threat, I mean as we've seen with the development of nuclear weapons. We're hoping that the Iraqis, in fact, are going to have the kind of security and stability they need so that what you're really dealing with is the internal security of Iraq, rather than trying to provide reassurance against an external foe.

How long will the United States be obligated to protect and occupy the capital in Iraq? For how long will the U.S. be responsible for the security and stability of Tikrit should that area erupt in violence in 2009 or 2010?

And not to be a partisan, are all of the Democratic candidates calling for a full withdrawal of troops from the theater or are they just for pulling back 2/3's of the forces and leaving behind a Korean-model of their own? As was noted by Ted Koppel on an opinion piece on NPR recently, Senator Clinton does not define how many American forces would be removed when she makes campaign statements to that effect, leaving Koppel to comment that all the candidates are going to feel the pressure to leave behind some force presence inside Iraqi borders.

It would appear that very few in Washington will support a complete withdrawal of armed American forces from the country on any time table that the public would desire. With a Democratic presidential thought process that mirrors what the Administration has fed the media lately, it may be that the United States will not bring the international community in, through the U.N. and border countries, to alleviate part of the strife and remove the occupation mindset from Iraq. Alas, the model of 50,000 or more soldiers and Marines cycling in and out of a foreign country may be too attractive for this President and future Presidents to resist.

And what a shame that would be. The first President, George Washington, was quite a sage when he said in his farewell address to his country:

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; ... if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare, by which they have been dictated.

What Is The U.S. Doing?

How best can one describe what the United States of America has embarked upon in the Middle East. To be certain, the war and following occupation was not completely supported by the American public at its outset and throughout its course, but by in large most voters were satisfied enough with the job that President Bush was doing at the time of his re-election in November of 2004 to bear some responsibility for the policies of his administration. Hence this review of where things stand.

What the U.S. has done is roil tensions within the region at large to a breaking point. Countless actions and decisions have foisted upon those in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Israel (to name just a few) an unrest that was, during 2000, a very distant possibility. The Palestinian issue in the West Bank and Gaza Strip certainly was not calm and peaceful by any means, but to the extent that there was hope for some negotiable resolution seemed closer rather than further away. Saddam Hussein was president of Iraq by sheer brute force and the country was held fast by his rule, save for the Kurdish north. The Taliban with its strict adherence to Islamic law (of the Sunni strain) enabled Osama bin Laden to develop and train al Qaeda but remained in conflict with Iran to its south. Turkey had been wary of the Kurds within its own borders but felt relatively safe from a breakaway faction of its own population with the Kurds in northern Iraq who still were not an independent entity. Syria's dominance over Lebanon's independence was about to change, but that too would bring about the ethnic problems within Lebanon which were the causes of its very own civil war from 1975 - 1990.

On and on the various factions go prior to 2002. Many of the states involved served to be counterweights to other states yielding marginal stability, but stability nonetheless.

Enter the Bush Administration and the summer of 2002 (post "Axis of Evil" speech). With forces now routing the Taliban from power (and eliminating an adversary to Iran's east) the country found the policy-makers fixated on Iraq as an incredible threat to America. A country with a power structure almost entirely made up of minority Sunnis pitted against the majority Shia who have been suppressed for decades will be the target of an invading force half the size of the one used more than ten years prior to oust and secure Kuwait. On August 26th, Vice President Cheney spoke before the VFW National Convention and laid out the groundwork for invasion. Chemical weapons and a supposed desire for nuclear capabilities directed at the U.S. tied together with a flimsy rope that Hussein would hand these weapons over to al Qaeda. The speech and subsequent expositions by various individuals from the President on down continued the theme which would have been convincing had the facts supported their collective statements.

Unfortunately, this would not come to pass for most if not all of the conjectures laid forth.

Through the clouded lens, the United States would invade a country of 24 million with a force of 300,900 with little if any discussion of post-war activities (and in some circles without the use of the word 'occupation' at all). Again, the one identifiable beneficiary of a Hussein-less Iraq would be a theocratic Shiite Iran to the east and the Shiite population within the country. The faltering Iraq would inspire more angst among close neighbors such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However if the rhetoric prior to the invasion was to be taken seriously, the United States would be in and out and leave behind a strong freely elected government at little cost to the taxpayers back half a world away and everything would be better.

(A large aside here: it is obvious that the weapons turned out not to exist, and that this is the main reason why Senators, opinion writers, and the like say that they would not have supported the invasion had they known this. That view must come to terms with several intelligence estimates that put forth the conjecture that even if Saddam Hussein had access to such weapons, he was quite unlikely to use them save on an invading force, and would be incredibly resistant to giving away such munitions to bands of unwieldy terrorists who might in turn use them against him. The larger point that launching a war of aggression against a country that was not posing a direct threat against the U.S. as being completely indefensible appears to be lost in the cacophony of rejoinders such as "we were lied into war." Preventative war has much the same consequences as preventative arrests of individuals by the state - it will yield worse outcomes then what it desires to prevent.)

Now several years have passed since this rosy scenario was swept off the drawing board and the U.S. presence has become one of holding this Shiite death squad away from that Sunni band of insurgents. Or vice versa; or shooting at both. The civil war that has grown since 2003 and 2004 has clearly moved beyond the control of Army and Marine commanders on the ground, and moreover has eclipsed the understanding of many in Washington, D.C., to the extent that it has yet to be officially recognized by the President as actually existing.

With the horizon looking fairly bleak on the Iraqi front, the American public is treated to new threats from its own government. An encounter with Iran.

Why is the Administration pulling out all the stops to make it appear that Iran is doing something insidious inside Iraq to the detriment of American interests? And why is the fear-baiting logic based on the proposition that Iran is meddling in the affairs of another country; did not America do this first by invading and occupying the land itself? Noam Chomsky makes the connection that this whole situation would be absolutely unacceptable to Americans if the debate were reversed: Iran has invaded Canada and Mexico and now dares the U.S. to further confrontation.

"It is, however, useful to ask how we would act if Iran had invaded and occupied Canada and Mexico and was arresting U.S. government representatives there on the grounds that they were resisting the Iranian occupation (called "liberation," of course). Imagine as well that Iran was deploying massive naval forces in the Caribbean and issuing credible threats to launch a wave of attacks against a vast range of sites -- nuclear and otherwise -- in the United States, if the U.S. government did not immediately terminate all its nuclear energy programs (and, naturally, dismantle all its nuclear weapons). Suppose that all of this happened after Iran had overthrown the government of the U.S. and installed a vicious tyrant (as the US did to Iran in 1953), then later supported a Russian invasion of the U.S. that killed millions of people (just as the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980, killing hundreds of thousands of Iranians, a figure comparable to millions of Americans). Would we watch quietly?"

That is not a rhetorical question. The answer is an emphatic 'No'. This does not excuse Iran from its own daredevil diplomacy, but the greater context of what our actions have wrought should never be left behind to debate the merits of Iran's statements and actions in a political vacuum.

So Iran is next, while Iraq and Afghanistan are by any measuring stick trundling towards failed states with America's over-indulgent help. Is that what the United States wants?

The choice seems somewhat clear: leave Iraq. It is imperative that the American forces quickly depart the field. It may be even more imperative that the United States acknowledge its own shortcomings and failures with regards to the invasion and post-invasion plans and to quickly convene a long-term solution with all the neighbors regardless of whether they are currently viewed as friend or foe. To leave behind nothing in the wake of departing military personnel would probably be catastrophic to not only the country but the region as a whole. The connection of the entire region (as best can be established and as difficult as that will be) to the outcome may serve to lighten the slaughter but there can really be no definitive statement on what the departure of the Americans will mean in terms of lives lost or saved. Yet something must be tried other than brute force by the occupier. Even if that worked for Saddam Hussein, it is not the option America needs with which to tarnish itself.

What the United States has done to Iraq will most certainly be a most dark spot in our history. Sure there will be some who debate even this point, but there are always those get left behind as the real world labors on. What the U.S. needs to do from this point forward is extricate itself from foreign entanglements already ongoing, and resist the urge to gin up news one for further misadventures. All the while actually engaging in real dialog with nations within the region to ensure actual cooperation that benefits more than just one side.

Sadly, this Administration may not heed said advice.

Regulation 635-200, Chapter 5-13

A very interesting article came out through The Nation magazine titled, "How Specialist Town Lost His Benefits" by Joshua Kors. Within the article the reader learns how Specialist Town was discharged from the Army after several months recuperating from a near fatal run-in with a rocket in Ramadi, Iraq. Three years pass by and both the Army and Jon Town realize that he will not be making his way back to active duty. One would presume that suffering great physical harm from a rocket attack would logically need some form of medical disability or benefits from the military, but that is where the story changes.

Enter Regulation 635-200 of the United States Army, Chapter 5 section 13 (PDF link, page 66 of the PDF | page 52 in the manual). That section follows:

5–13. Separation because of personality disorder Under the guidance in chapter 1, section II, a soldier may be separated for personality disorder (not amounting to disability (see AR 635–40)) that interferes with assignment or with performance of duty, when so disposed as indicated in a, below.
a. This condition is a deeply ingrained maladaptive pattern of behavior of long duration that interferes with the soldier’s ability to perform duty. (Exceptions: combat exhaustion and other acute situational maladjustments.) The diagnosis of personality disorder must have been established by a psychiatrist or doctoral-level clinical psychologist with necessary and appropriate professional credentials who is privileged to conduct mental health evaluations for the DOD components. It is described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) of Mental Disorders, 4th edition.
b. Commanders will not take action prescribed in this chapter in lieu of disciplinary action solely to spare a soldier who may have committed serious acts of misconduct for which harsher penalties may be imposed under the UCMJ.
c. Separation because of personality disorder is authorized only if the diagnosis concludes that the disorder is so severe that the soldier’s ability to function effectively in the military environment is significantly impaired. Separation for personality disorder is not appropriate when separation is warranted under chapters 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, or 18 of this regulation; AR 380–67; or AR 635–40.
d. Nothing in this paragraph precludes separation of a soldier who has such a condition for other reasons authorized by this regulation.
e. Separation processing may not be initiated under this paragraph until the soldier has been counseled formally concerning deficiencies and has been afforded ample opportunity to overcome those deficiencies as reflected in appropriate counseling or personnel records. (See para 1–16.)
f. When it has been determined that separation under this paragraph is appropriate, the unit commander will take the actions specified in the notification procedure. (See chap 2, sec I.)
g. For separation authority, see paragraph 1–19.
h. The service of a soldier separated per this paragraph will be characterized as honorable unless an entry-level separation is required under chapter 3, section III. Characterization of service under honorable conditions may be awarded to a soldier who has been convicted of an offense by general court-martial or who has been convicted by more than one special court-martial in the current enlistment, period of obligated service, or any extension thereof.

The premise is that if the soldier has a mental disorder unrelated to injuries sustained in combat then the Army need not follow through with medical benefits and treatment, but may discharge the individual nonetheless on said disorder. By the article, the way this regulation is being presented to wounded veterans is as follows: A doctor tells the veteran, "You can get out of the service if we discharge you on a personality disorder. You'll keep your benefits and keep the signing bonus, too. It is just quicker this way." If that were true and documented, that in itself is an epic tragedy to the wounded soldier as they do not keep VA medical benefits with such a discharge, and some face the prospect of owing the Army money because they will have to return a portion of a signing bonus based on time served in the Army.

From the article:

"In the last six years the Army has diagnosed and discharged more than 5,600 soldiers because of personality disorder, according to the Defense Department. And the numbers keep rising: 805 cases in 2001, 980 cases in 2003, 1,086 from January to November 2006. "It's getting worse and worse every day," says the official who handles discharge papers. "At my office the numbers started out normal. Now it's up to three or four soldiers each day. It's like, suddenly everybody has a personality disorder." "

And across all armed forces, 22,500 soldiers have been discharged in this manner. While there are certainly cases to find where the individual soldier, sailor, or marine had a real disorder which could be cause for the 5-13 discharge, it appears there are going to be several cases where veterans are being whisked out of service to save benefit costs to the Department of Defense.

If one is not for the quagmire in Iraq, it takes little intelligence or humanity to understand that those who dedicate themselves to the military need better treatment and care than this. There was the obvious case of neglect at Walter Reed Hospital which was quickly seized upon by the national media outlets, but something innocuous such as this might not make the headlines. It is imperative that further investigations be conducted into the matter to ensure that the Administration is honoring the promises of those it sends into harm's way.

Scandals Until 2009 And Beyond

While the President fought vigorously to hold on to the reigns of power in 2004 and succeeded, it may have been a better plan to exit after just one term and avoid the nearly daily barrage of new charges, whistle blowers, and scandalous revelations that now fill the press. Many of these scuttlebutts which were only hinted at during the latter part of the first term are now open to the public.

Contorted pre-invasion intelligence; perverted reconstruction contracts and oversight in Iraq; revisions of scientific information; abuse of civil liberties on the basis of extra security; breaching a CIA agent's cover for political retribution; secret illegal wire-tapping; the FBI and National Security Letters; and the firing of 8 U.S. Attorneys for political motives. All of these might have been swept under the rug or not have happened had President Bush lost. Yet now they all sit in a pile on the desk at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue awaiting a Congressional investigation, of which there are many coming.

Of the recent two-term Presidents, all have had their most serious issues in the second term (which makes sense, since if a President has their worst issue during the first term, they are more than likely not to be rewarded with a second 4-year term). Reagan, Clinton, and Nixon, took severe bruisings and suffered humiliation while presiding over the last four years and obviously in the case of Nixon, not seeing the last years at all. On the surface with President George W. Bush, the tight seal that the Administration kept on all political and operational details prevented the public and Congress from knowing what it was doing. As the lid has come off (most recently with the I. Lewis Libby trial, the Justice Department's rebuke of the FBI's handling of National Security Letters, and Justice's own dilemma with the firing of non-compliant attorneys) the White House must concentrate more and more effort on defending itself and less time from actually accomplishing political goals.

If this near-term history is a measuring stick, the modern President who successfully claims a second term has at most five years of time to move the national debate - beyond that there is little room left to breathe before the subpoenas come strolling in. This President should see a fair share of them quite soon.

NSL - (Not To Be Confused With SNL)

Glenn Greenwald has yet another excellent post regarding the National Security Letters the Federal Bureau of Investigations have been issuing since the Patriot Act's inception. With the report from the Justice Department investigation it appears the FBI has been playing a little bit loose with the rules regarding the issuance of said NSLs.

Putin's Remarks In Munich

President Vladimir Putin addressed the Munich Conference on Security Policy February 10, 2007 with a rather forceful reproval of American policies. Such an outburst of criticism was summarily trounced in most press accounts as a bellicose loosening of the tongue on the part of the Russian leader.

Two opinions contrary to those rebukes come from Ivan Eland and Patrick Buchanan.

In Buchanan's opinion piece he suggests that there are more than just a few grievances that Russia could have with the U.S. in terms of international relations:

"When the Cold War ended, we seized upon our "unipolar moment" as the lone superpower to seek geopolitical advantage at Russia's expense.

Though the Red Army had picked up and gone home from Eastern Europe voluntarily, and Moscow felt it had an understanding we would not move NATO eastward, we exploited our moment. Not only did we bring Poland into NATO, we brought in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and virtually the whole Warsaw Pact, planting NATO right on Mother Russia's front porch. Now, there is a scheme afoot to bring in Ukraine and Georgia in the Caucasus, the birthplace of Stalin.

Second, America backed a pipeline to deliver Caspian Sea oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, to bypass Russia.

Third, though Putin gave us a green light to use bases in the old Soviet republics for the liberation of Afghanistan, we now seem hell-bent on making those bases in Central Asia permanent.

Fourth, though Bush sold missile defense as directed at rogue states like North Korea, we now learn we are going to put anti-missile systems into Eastern Europe. And against whom are they directed?"

Buchanan goes on to name more, but the point is stated fairly well just with these four; that the U.S. has been camping in the backyard of so many issues close to Russia's interest would make any policy maker take notice and wonder if some of these initiatives aren't a bit too far-reaching.

Eland comes to many of the same conclusions that Buchanan does, but concentrates on the adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan to restate that the aggressive militarism promoted by the Bush Administration has served world security quite poorly, and (if one looks beyond the tragedy that is modern day Iraq) has damaged the United States acutely. He goes on to write in his concluding paragraph:

In his most astute criticism of the lone superpower's foreign policy, Putin noted that the power amassed by a global power "destroys it from within." Alluding to the aggressive, militaristic U.S. foreign policy, Putin noted correctly that, "it has nothing in common with democracy, of course." Surprisingly, Putin, a domestic autocrat himself, seems to see what the U.S. Founders knew, but what the occupants of the post-World War II imperial presidency have not been able to fathom. During the Roman Republic, the concentration of power associated with a militarized foreign policy led to the disintegration of the republic itself. The same thing is happening in the United States now. Thus, to safeguard one of the greatest domestic systems in the world, U.S. citizens and policymakers should drop the Tarzan foreign policy and return to the Founders' policy of minimal interference in the affairs of other nations.

Pay special attention to the phrase "destroys it from within." So long as America willfully engages in active armed conflict without a definable national security interest, the country will slowly tear itself down without the help of a foreign power lifting a proverbial finger.

Non-Binding Resolutions From The 109th

During the ongoing debate on President Bush's force escalation being hosted in the House of Representatives, many have claimed that since the debate is over a non-binding resolution the whole affair is meaningless.

John Boehner, Republican Representative from Ohio, said that the debate was "a political charade lacking both the seriousness and the gravity of the issue that it's meant to represent."

It would appear that non-binding resolutions are not unusual in Congresses past and present. Two quick examples come from the 109th - H Res 861 pledged support to the President and called for no timetables for withdrawal from Iraq. A then majority member of the House was quoted as saying: "Retreat is not an option in Iraq,'' declared House Majority Leader John Boehner, R-Ohio. "Achieving victory is our only option, for the American people and our kids." At the time it was not a charade to pass such legislation.

Then there was the pro-Israel, anti-Hizbullah non-binding resolution passed in July of 2006 that supported the military effort of the IDF. It placed on record 410 members in favor of Israel's tactics while only 8 voted against the measure.

So what is wrong with Congress putting something on record? It would seem that both parties enjoy using the procedure to generate debate and coverage of political issues while avoiding the full force of law by their actions. It is a tactic to an end, and it only matters for which side the tactic is used before it can be judged right or wrong.

Likely Results From A Surge In Troop Numbers In Baghdad

President Bush made public his plans to increase troop presence in the city of Baghdad on Wednesday, January 10, 2007. What are the likely outcomes for such an increase?

The hoped for outcome by the Administration of more soldiers and marines is that violence within the city will be quelled, and that the political process can continue towards making progress in peacefully settling the struggles between the Sunnis and the Shiites in Iraq. With that intervention resolved, then the Iraqi government can take on the responsibility of rebuilding physical infrastructure and communities (through 10 billion dollars of its own money, not American funds). There was no time limit set to the 20,000+ increase in troop deployments but it would be presumed that once all of these successes come to pass, that a gradual phase down would follow in keeping with the slogan, "U.S. troops will stand down as Iraqi troops stand up."

From what the American experience has shown thus far in the occupation in Iraq (the occupation beginning on or around May 1, 2003 with the announcement that major military operations were complete), there is little evidence to lend to the above conclusions with regards to a major troop increase in a specific geographic area of Iraq. Fallujah, Samarra, Haditha, and more towns and cities in Iraq have displayed the inadequate nature of immediate deployments and intense fighting followed by the relative calm - the military flushes the insurgents out, but eventually the fighting leaves behind a brutalized town and the irregular fighting force off to another town to fight another day. An article linked over at Juan Cole's web log hinted that the regular forces of the Mahdi Army already were shape-shifting into the background of Iraqi life in Baghdad in advance of the surge. From the article, "Mahdi Army militiamen say that while they remain undercover now, they are simply waiting for the security plan to end." Encouraging that a simple change of plans will go to subvert this major new strategy of the President's.

Furthermore, the increase in military numbers provides an increase in live targets for a city of millions. IED's and sniper attacks have not gone out of fashion to date, and more patrols with Iraqi units will most likely increase the rate of attacks for months to come. It would be quite likely as well that Iraqi police units will be specific targets if the military patrols are deemed to dangerous to attack. Police headquarters and sign-up stations have been relentlessly attacked during the entire occupation, so it may not be noticeable over a period of time if they increase or decrease minimally.

And what is to be said about the general populations' view on the heightened security measures? Some may certainly welcome the perceived increase in security on the streets of Baghdad, but many will also view this increase as a reminder of an occupying nation taking up residence in their capital. Imagine an armored personnel carrier rolling down your street with an armed machine gunner atop the vehicle and ask yourself if you feel safe or scared at the sight.

Increasing the numbers will probably also yield one or two mishaps on the part of U.S. military units engaging enemies and civilians alike in street-level fighting. More raids and further insults to Islamic traditions and sensitivities can only add to the recruiting strategy of insurgents and sectarian divisions making the long-term goals more remote.

Some or maybe all of these instances may never come to fruition but this is the glum prediction of Iraq, and history has shown that the more dire prognostications have come true more often than the rosy ones. The Administration has constantly relied on brute force to fix Iraq, and there are few if any tangible results from said policies. The rhetoric of the President is fixed on success, but the jargon of his policy is set on destruction.

Breaking Baghdad even further is not the solution.

How One Acts Like A Hypocrite

The Democrats are just about to take control of the House and the Senate, thus removing from power the Republicans and their twelve year rule. With it, the leadership of the House will now become the respectful minority and as such, they will need to yield to the rules laid down by the Democratic leadership.

Understanding this reversal, three Congressmen felt obliged to request that Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi honor her proposition of 2004 to establish a minority bill of rights. Insisting that Democrats, "respect customary and regular order in considering legislation, and establishing that the rights of the minority party will be respected."

Hypocrisy is professing one set of beliefs for others while not adhering to said set of beliefs when applied to you. The House was a well-documented bastion of aggressive rules designed to all but excuse the minority members from participation when under Republican reigns since 1994, and now three members beseech the new leader to understand the importance of fair rules in the House.

Of course there should be no reason whatsoever for the Speaker to not change the rules so as to allow the minority to have a voice in the institution. It is the right thing to do and will no doubt reflect highly on the body as a whole that the Democrats encourage open debate. Yet to take a stand which is blatantly and unabashedly hypocritical will no doubt let many voters feel satisfied with their collective decisions on November 7, 2006.

The Iraqi Study Group - Recommendations 40 - 79

This is the second installment of a review of the Iraqi Study Group. The first review was to be a quick study but transformed into a longer post. With the work started, this post will try to finish the observations.

At recommendation 40, the report adopts changes in military strategy for U.S. forces present in the country today. The group does not suggest adding any further troops (their purview was that it would not lessen the violence country-wide, nor was there a sufficient reserve of unused forces to deploy) but focusing more personnel into Iraqi battalions and brigades. The purpose is to increase combat readiness of Iraqi units and further expand their logistics and security capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States couldcarry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counter-terrorism operations.

RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military personnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company level. The U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel.

RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment for Iraqi forces.

To the extent that most of these recommendations have been taken up in varying forms to date, the sense is that they must be first and foremost in the operations of the American military inside Iraq. This becomes the new strategy for military operations rather than the current path of moving U.S. troops around to fight battles with insurgents and patrolling trouble spots indefinitely. This is another finding based on the reality that American forces cannot stay there forever, and that there needs to be solid training and a corps of disciplined security forces inside Iraq removed from sectarian division. It cannot be known if such a task is even feasible, but it was deemed worthy enough to try.

Moving away from the Iraqi security forces, the panel next took up the steps involved with resetting of American forces. President Bush campaigned in 2000 on a platform of strengthening the military (claiming that two entire divisions were not ready for service), but the Pentagon will have many serious issues when budgeting for the next two to four years considering the nature of the occupation and the amount of equipment loss not to mention the difficulties in terms of recruiting for the long-term. Hence recommendations 46 through 49 assess what the Administration should entertain as its next series of goals for defense.

RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned to the continental United States in order to “reset” the force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.

RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years.

RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with the relevant committees of Congress, should assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in research and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies involved in the stability and reconstruction effort.

Of this set of suggestions, the general premise is that there has been substantial damage to the military from the past three years of occupation. Those elements need to be mended, most likely into the next Presidential term.

The report moves from what the U.S. should do and steps into the internal affairs of the Iraqi government when point 50 comes up:

RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.

As was mentioned in a Morning Edition report on NPR on the 7th, moving the INP into the Ministry of Defense is moving a force that had been overseen by the Shiite-dominated Ministry of the Interior into the Defense Ministry which was ceded to the Sunnis during the government formation period. That alone may not be even possible, yet the idea that a more para-military force which the Iraqi National Police represents become a part of Defense makes sense, and the report goes further to say that the Iraqi Border Police also move into the department. The Ministry of the Interior would maintain control over the Iraqi Police Service but this may not be enough to sate Shiite government leaders.

RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have total responsibility for border control and external security.

Once the amount of civil war tones down, it would be necessary to invigorate the criminal justice of Iraq, and recommendation 52 goes to this point:

RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater responsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand its cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi judicial system in order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians.

Recommendation 53 and 54 deal with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior itself:

RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a process of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over local police forces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse financial support to local police should be transferred to the Ministry of the Interior.

RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed with current efforts to identify, register, and control the Facilities Protection Service.

Some of these changes asked of the Interior Ministry point to pulling power away from the local governments and placing it at a higher level, making the operation run from a more federal level. These ideas seem to run into the fine line of altering a sovereign country from afar, but there is little doubt that Interior Ministry has taken on a negative image among Sunnis and international observers as an infiltrated organization run to exact revenge. If that were indeed the case (as press stories continually indicate), then there is a need to revamp the organization and clean out those elements that will sabotage security. Much like other recommendations, the chances of success seem remote at this stage.

Items 55 to 61 stress the U.S. defense and criminal investigation agencies continuance of training roles within the Iraqi Police forces.

RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its mission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.

RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice should direct the training mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry of the Interior.

RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training teams are imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded and the numbers of civilian training officers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should be obtained from among experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace the military police personnel currently assigned to training teams.

RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity.

RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.

RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standard administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures that Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in partnership.

RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice.

Many of these suggestions are presumed to already have been ongoing from the start of the American occupation, but apparently there is a dire need to go back to the basics in terms of training forces and bringing the current judicial system to a competent level. If that is the case, many Americans would be surprised at this deficit.

Oil. Not surprisingly, this received more than just a passing comment from the ISG. One of the longer recommendations in the report, there are two sections to it comprising ten points for action. They have been broken down into Short Term and Long Term goals.

Short Term
RECOMMENDATION 62:
• As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract investment.
• The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States should no longer fund such infrastructure projects.
• The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. Protective measures could include a program to improve pipeline security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed amounts).
• Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector.
• In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain.

Long Term
RECOMMENDATION 63:
• The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.
• The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.
• To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export revenues.
• The United States should support the World Bank’s efforts to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits.
• The United States should provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating professional training programs for management and technical personnel.

Some items are certain to be unpopular, but the many bullet points regarding Iraq's oil management allude to efficiency gains and a lean towards free market ideals. Possible sticking points would be: raising the price of gasoline on regular Iraqis via reducing energy subsidies, providing a structure to disburse oil revenues, the U.S. removing financial support for further infrastructure projects. Under the long term items there is an appearance of condescension in tone regarding the Iraqi system of management with regards to the oil industry. From the ISG's investigation though, it appears that transparency is lacking in the current system and it sees establishing an open system as a means to attract outside investment for the oil industry.

Further support is requested in general infrastructure and makes up recommendations 64 to 66.

RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and job creation, including reliance on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be provided on a nonsectarian basis.

RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively participate in the design and construction of projects.

RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take the lead in funding assistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian agencies.

There was talk throughout 2006 that the funding requests for further infrastructure support within Iraq was going to be phased down if not out completely in the near term. Recommendation 64 explicitly states that the opposite should be instituted, and an increase be requested to assist the economy of Iraq. The amount of $5 billion is approximate to the support given Israel in economic and military assistance today. Suggestion 65 depends on the security situation within the country, and 66 allows for humanitarian aid.

RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq.

The language preceding this recommendation is as follows:

"A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington still hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq’s reconstruction. Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in short supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held accountable for the overall reconstruction effort."

At this stage, the need for a representative inside Iraq to further coordinate reconstruction efforts demonstrates many of the pitfalls that the U.S. occupation created for itself. With the Democratic majority in Congress more than likely to address some of the grosser neglect for oversight of reconstruction efforts, the creation of a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction will place any further efforts under the guise of some form of oversight within Iraq.

Under the heading Improving the Effectiveness of Assistance Programs, the ISG supports an office that is responsible for quickly dispersing and rescinding funds for to projects that "promote national reconciliation." These bureaucratic suggestions essentially deal with several details of funding and supporting programs in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the authority to spend significant funds through a program structured along the lines of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership.

RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistance programs in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, should be authorized and implemented.

RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from international donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance projects should be provided.

Under number 70, the ISG included a description referencing the difficulties of employing the State Department and the Defense Department to promote and fund programs that may have competing or crossing priorities and different oversight committees back in Congress. Such difficulties may not have had top headlines in the past several years, but it is a positive sign to see it identified and placed on the list of to-do's.

Funding the Iraq occupation in the United States is an interesting subject in that the executive branch has yet to include a full accounting of the cost when requesting monies for the following budget year. Instead, the White House typically will make emergency funding requests throughout the year for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This act makes it more difficult for the public at large to determine the ongoing costs of both operations, and what the dollars are going towards. Hence:

RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the President’s annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.

The only thing preventing this from taking place is Commander-in-Chief himself.

Personnel issues make up ideas 73 through 76. A quote that stands out is, "Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient communication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage."

RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highest possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be assigned to Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others - respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.

RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar technical assistance capabilities.

These suggestions are reasonable. The amount of time required to put these types of resources inside Iraq must be in excess of 12 months given the training involved and the dearth of probable volunteers. The odds of this coming true seem remote.

Lacking solid intelligence makes up the last of the recommendations by the group, essentially outlining a failing in learning and understanding the society in general and the resistance in particular. Citing the amount of money spent by the Pentagon in protecting soldiers and marines from roadside bombs, the team notes that there is little comparable funding to gaining intelligence on why the insurgency continues to build and deploy these devices.

RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground.

RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.

Additionally, recommendation 78 makes a special point of how the United States is collecting and distributing information in Iraq with a specific note that the Defense department under-reported violent acts for a single day in July of 2006 by a factor of over one hundred. The reporting appears devised to put as positive a light on events, and the ISG would rather this be put to rest and opt for actual figures to be reported as they occur.

Recommendation 79 is a tricky situation in that allowing the CIA to provide support and assistance in intelligence gathering could quickly be used for sectarian purposes and place greater burden on the Iraqi government in terms of violent and unrest.

After the 79th recommendation, the report ends. At that point, it might be best to return to the executive summary and re-read the conclusion therein.

Conclusion
It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation. The dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq.

The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region, and the United States of America can emerge stronger.

The end result of this document could be read as the most bitter pill of George Bush's presidency thus far. It denudes him of the warrior-hero visage, asks that he actually talk to other people by way of diplomacy, and by its sheer existence admit that his oversight and leadership have failed. To a person who at one time could not think of a single mistake he had made (only the weak admit such things), this report summarizes a concrete record of failure.

Beyond the mere political ramifications for the President (and an initial review of his statements make the adoption of all 79 proposals far from likely), the general proposition is that this adventure by America in Iraq is at its best on a tenuous footing. The general region is in danger of falling into ethnic war as is mentioned in the report and this was a large motivating factor for stressing the diplomatic accord for all interested parties. The chilling thought is that these specific proposals are being submitted to an Executive known for being dismissive of international diplomacy.

Even with some of the less spectacular recommendations within the report, there is at least a basis now for the American public to understand the very real and monstrous threat that this preventative war has created. While events on the ground in Baghdad are bad, the problem is no longer confined to a 50 mile radius around the city. If the ISG's report does only one thing it should heighten all of our concerns about what happens next in the region. Will the U.S. continue to house 140,000 troops and support staff in the country for five more years? Will all the troops be home by Christmas 2008? Can the U.N. and the New Diplomatic Offensive find peaceful compromise for Sunni, Shia, and Kurds alike? All of these are incredibly difficult questions, and only a strong American public voice will likely move Congress and the President to act along the lines of these recommendations.

Unfortunately, one "must dance with the one who brung ya" as the old saying goes. The White House has put forward a wildly optimistic view of Iraq for so long that it must sting the eyes of aides and Presidents alike to read this report. Even if (a large if) the President adopted some of these measures it would be a decent start and a long overdue beginning to changing the outcome of the occupation. Yet as stated before here, the odds of this happening are dishearteningly slim. The first milestones that the ISG lists is approval of several laws as suggested in the report; increased Iraqi security funding; a raise in interest rates by the Central Iraqi Bank - all by the end of 2006 or early 2007. While those would be governed by the Iraqi Parliament and not President Bush, if these are not even brought it up will be an excellent indicator of how events will go for the rest of next year.

Anything appears to be better than what is happening now. Let us hope that by January 2008 there isn't another commission assembled to figure out how to stop the great Middle East War.

The Iraqi Study Group - Recommendations 1 - 39

Several months in the development, and with a panel of citizens outside of partisan warfare, the Iraqi Study Group created at the behest of Congress released their findings to the White House, the Congress, and now the American public. The executive summary begins: "The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved." A markedly different tone than President Bush's statements on October 25th, 2006. He stated at the time, "We're winning, and we will win, unless we leave before the job is done," when speaking of Iraq.

So now the report from the commission is ready for consumption after an election where the clear signal was an utter dissatisfaction with the present occupation of Iraq. The quick summary on the report is encouraging diplomacy with most of Iraq's neighbors where feasible, and for adding new vigor to the training of Iraqi security forces. All of this with milestones to measure progress along the way placed on an actual calendar (page 80 of the document issued by the ISG).

A unique caveat to the second major point of the commission's finding is that if the security level does not improve, then "the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government." By its very implication, the ISG would have the United States set sail if the Iraqi government doesn't play ball to a new policy as adopted from the report. A dramatic pronouncement indeed. In Recommendation 41:

The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America's other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.

This certainly does not mesh with the "stay the course" rhetoric of President Bush, that is certain. It would also make clear that the more one drags the process along inside the government of Iraq, the bigger risk they run of having a thoroughly unstable country rather than a somewhat unstable country.

What is somewhat refreshing is to hear a ten-person panel place statements such as this in their report: "There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq. But there are actions that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, working together, can and should take to increase the probability of avoiding disaster there, and increase the chance of success." This may sadden Senator John McCain somewhat for his support of sending even more troops into Iraq. The premise is that this is a political dilemma that a military, any military, cannot solve by itself. A private can't force one person to love another through the business end of a rifle. One might call this a refreshing bit of reality added to the conversation if it weren't so late in coming due to the Administration's posture on the affair.

There are many, many different options here, but as the ISG states at the end of the executive summary, the recommendations, "should not be separated or carried out in isolation." This states unequivocally that the proprietor of this entanglement not pick and choose the least difficult options to implement. Seventy-nine recommendations and not one of them offers a fig leaf of cover for the debacle that President Bush founded.

Update: Further Thoughts
Upon a more thorough review of the Iraq Study Group's findings, there are some key issues which may create several problems with the implementation of these 79 recommendations (aside from the most obvious obstacle being the President and his officials).

The initial recommendations focus on the "New Diplomatic Offensive" (page 44 of the report / page 62 of the PDF) and the "Iraq International Support Group" (pg. 46 / pg. 64) to be created in order to address regional concerns (the Israel/Palestinian issue, Lebanon and Syria, Iran as examples) and assist in the regional participation of border countries and others at large respectively. The sheer difficulty of pulling this many countries together (an initial count of more than a dozen) to focus on the stability of Iraq with many of the players at odds with others or elements inside Iraq is quite a tall drink of water. Adding the diplomatic contortionist work involved in progressing towards a lasting peace process in Israel and addressing the Sunni-Shiite divide unleashed inside Iraq (while laudable as a goal can be) is an incredibly monstrous hurdle.

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should launched before December 31, 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players should be to:
i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s neighbors.
iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries.
iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.
v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.
vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq.
vii. Validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad.
viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).
ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk.
x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones, including better performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of militias.

RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in addition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States and the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national reconciliation in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive.

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries—for instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq could also become members.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S. effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstances require.

RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on the participation of the office of the United Nations Secretary-General in its work. The United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as his representative.

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic Offensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries that take into account the interests, perspectives, and potential contributions as suggested above.

Recommendations 1 through 8 lay the international groundwork. The main thrust is to build a coalition of those with real stakes in the outcome of Iraq which should have been contemplated at the outset yet never came to fruition. The report notes that each country has its own purview to tend to, and states:

Left to their own devices, these [border] governments will tend to reinforce ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi society. But if the Support Group takes a systematic and active approach toward considering the concerns of each country, we believe that each can be encouraged to play a positive role in Iraq and the region.

It would appear that this coalition will look right on paper, but may yield results not to anyone's particular liking.

The report moves forward to express the sentiment that while it may be unpleasant to some within the United States, some strides must be taken in order to bring Syria and Iran to the table where Iraq is concerned. This is absolutely a step in the right direction. Recommendations 9 through 12 concern how Iran and Syria may be brought in and how the United States ought to handle dicey international relations outside of Iraq.

Recommendations 13 to 17 try and push forward a two-state solution to the Israeli / Palestinian conflict and several demands on Syria to resist the temptation to interfere in Lebanon. These feel somewhat out of place with the general findings of the group, but the impetus is to try to add further calm in Middle East. The likelihood of Syria to convince Hamas to acknowledge Israel's right to exist has a slim chance of coming true in the near-term, if ever.

RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States to provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.

This is obviously outside of Iraq, but Afghanistan has the distinct look of a pre-2001 invasion country. If ever a redeployment of forces were possible within a year or two from Iraq, it should be to shore up the government in the capital of Kabul as well as the larger countryside.

Many of the commentaries so far of the report discuss the following recommendations on internal improvements made by the Iraqi government itself. Recommendation 21 is going to be cited more often than most as it states fairly clearly that without internal improvements, the United States would be under less and less obligation to sustain its current troop level and political support. It does not say however what would replace this support; it is probably seen as a threat or an incentive to move Iraqi leaders forward.

RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the President should convey as much detail as possible about the substance of these exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi people, and the countries in the region well informed.

RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces, and to continue political, military, and economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced.

RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government.

RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.

Is it a timetable or isn't it a timetable? At this stage within America, there is probably a small minority that would not be in favor of a set timetable. Citizens here (and certainly there in Iraq) do not wish an indefinite tenure for U.S. Marines and Army troops on the ground in Baghdad or Mosul or Nineveh.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
By the end of 2006–early 2007:
- Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an election date
- Approval of the Petroleum Law
- Approval of the De-Baathification Law
- Approval of the Militia Law

By March 2007:
- A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary)

By May 2007:
- Completion of Militia Law implementation
- Approval of amnesty agreement
- Completion of reconciliation efforts

By June 2007:
- Provincial elections

SECURITY (pending joint U.S.-Iraqi review)
By the end of 2006:
- Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levels

By April 2007:
- Iraqi control of the Army

By September 2007:
- Iraqi control of provinces

By December 2007:
- Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support)

GOVERNANCE
By the end of 2006:
- The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20 percent and appreciate the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to combat accelerating inflation.
- Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum products and sell imported fuel at market prices.

Recommendations 24 and 25 just reiterate that the milestones are a start.

Recommendations 26 through 33 are suggestions for the internal affairs of Iraq. They run the gamut from reviewing and amending their constitution (a sore point for the Sunni population at the time of its adoption), to holding the lid on the "powder keg" of Kirkuk, to amnesty proposals and minority rights. All of these proposals will be at the whim or the will of Iraqi leaders in Parliament, but they are all linked to restraining the civil war tendencies already apparent within the borders of Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for success.

This has been repeated by the Administration that there are no long-term plans on the oil or the country as a military base of operations for the U.S. A reiteration on this claim can bring no harm.

RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.

RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation.

RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.

These are rational and reasonable expectations for all sides. Again, the likelihood of all of these camps coming together to stop the retribution killings that have run unabated for months on end shows little signs of occurring. Amnesty may not even be a popular path within Iraq, but it may provide cover for those who have performed the violence to date to not continue further still for fear of comeuppance.

RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of neutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial and technical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members.

These are common sense recommendations though there are no details regarding the depth or duration of financial and technical support to be provided.

More to come on the next forty recommendations.